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Abstract: The article offers a survey of the main effects of judicial inquiry on  corruption in Italy (the 
“mani pulite” inquiry) and scandals on the political and party system. Some data on the evolution and 
achievements of the inquiry mani pulite are briefly offered, then focusing on the political consequences of the 
scandal in terms of delegitimization and consequent  crisis of leading political figures, parties, and the 
political system as a whole. There is then a brief focus on the “lesson” of mani pulite – what did not work 
in political, institutional and societal mechanisms that should have provided a shelter against systemic 
corruption. Finally, the main long-term drawbacks of the judicial inquiry are analysed, e.g. the political 
career of the media tycoon Berlusconi, who was himself prosecuted for corruption crimes, with a dramatic 
increase of the institutional conflict between the political and the judicial power.  
Keywords: Corruption; Parties, Italian Political System; “Mani Pulite” Inquiry; Scandal. 
 
Resumo: O presente artigo apresenta um levantamento dos principais efeitos do inquérito judicial sobre a 
corrupção na Itália (especificamente a “Operação Mãos Limpas”) e os escândalos no sistema político e 
partidário do país. Alguns dados sobre a evolução e os alcances da Operação Mãos Limpas são brevemente 
expostos. Foca-se a atenção nas consequências políticas de tal escândalo em termos da deslegitimação e a 
consequente crise de liderança das figuras políticas, dos partidos e do sistema político como um todo. Assim, 
é uma exposição breve sobre as “lições” da Operação Mãos Limpas – o que não funcionou nos mecanismos 
políticos, institucionais e sociais que deveriam ter evitado a instauração da corrupção sistêmica. Finalmente, 
são analisadas, no longo prazo, as principais desvantagens desta investigação judicial como, por exemplo, a 
carreira política do midiático Berlusconi, ele mesmo processado por crimes de corrupção, incrementando 
dramaticamente o conflito institucional entre o poder político e o poder judiciário. 
Palavras-chave: Corrupção; Partidos; Sistema Político Italiano; Operação Mãos Limpas; Escândalos. 
 
 
1.  The systemic nature of political corruption became the main issue in 
the public debate in Italy short afterwards 17 February 1992, when the arrest 
of the socialist manager of a public hospice Mario Chiesa while taking a bribe 
from a small cleaning company started the so called “clean hands” (mani pulite) 
judicial inquiry in Milan. After a couple of months of imprisonment Chiesa 
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started to cooperate with judges, generating a snowball effect which quickly 
expanded investigations into the whole country, spreading also the celebration 
of the leading prosecutor (Antonio Di Pietro) and the pool of magistrates who 
soon supported him as popular heroes . In the following three years, five 
former prime ministers, more than five hundred members of Parliament, 
several thousand local politicians, party leaders, bureaucrats, public manager, 
entrepreneurs, professionals,  the customs service (responsible for 
investigating financial crimes in general), the main publicly-owned companies 
and even sectors of the magistracy itself, became involved in the mani pulite 
inquiry (TRAVAGLIO, BARBACETTO, GOMEZ, 2012). An idea of the 
size of the investigation can be gathered from the statistics for corruption 
accusations: between 1984 and 1991 in Italy the average ran at 252 cases a year 
involving 365 individuals; between 1992 and 1995 it increased to 1,095 cases 
involving 2,085 individuals. In the last of these years 1,065 accusations were 
made involving 2,731 persons. Only the Public Persecutor of Milan have, 
between 1992 and October 1996, produced 2,319 demands for formal charge 
related with corruption crimes (PROCURA DI MILANO, 1996; DELLA 
PORTA, VANNUCCI, 1999). 
2. The “clean hands” investigation brought about the most serious 
political crisis in the history of the Italian Republic. In a matter of months, the 
magistracy had opened a breach on a scene of corruption and political 
illegality involving the entire political class of the country and broad sectors of 
its business community. The equilibrium that had long characterised Italian 
politics collapsed, bringing to a transition towards what has been disputably 
defined as a “second Republic”. In fact, after 45 years of uninterrupted 
government the country’s largest single party, the Cristian Democrats, was 
cancelled along with its leaders, accompanied by the other parties of the ruling 
coalition, the Socialist Party included. Most leading political figures were 
forced to resign or go into exile; the major parties disappeared or underwent 
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radical transformtion; new parties emerged on the scene occupying the 
political space left by the old, and formerly marginalized parties (e.g. post-
fascist Alleanza Nazionale, xenophobic Lega Nord; post-communist 
Rifondazione comunista) entered into competing coalitions (DELLA 
PORTA, VANNUCCI, 2007b; VANNUCCI, 2009). 
The corruption scandal and the consequent delegitimization of the 
political elite provoked a crisis and a drastic transformation of the party 
system, with the emergence of effective alternation in government of 
competing coalitions, characterised also by an informal, almost-direct electoral 
investiture of the Prime Minister;  the emergence of new primary political 
actors, mainly the entrepreneur and media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi and his 
Forza Italia party as undisputed leader of the centre-right coalition. Quite 
paradoxically, the issue that acted as detonator of the crisis – evidence of a 
systemic corruption – quickly faded as an issue on the public agenda (DELLA 
PORTA, VANNUCCI, 1999b): in the public opinion’s disinterest, the first 
comprehensive anti-corruption law (n.190) passed only in 2012. Nor the 
involvement of the three-times Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, in several 
corruption scandals since 1994 and his conviction for fiscal fraud in 2014 
resulted in any significant discussion of reforms designed to combat 
corruption (DELLA PORTA, VANNUCCI, 2007a). On the contrary, 
Berlusconi’s involvement in corruption inquiries has worsened since the 
beginning of his political career, in 1994, a condition of institutional friction 
between the political and judicial branches of the State. Since the entering of 
Belusconi into the political arena, in fact, the asserted need for a profound 
reform of the administration of justice to reduce the allegedly arbitrary power 
of judges, who were claimed in Berlusconi’s political discourse to be politically 
biased and without any electoral legitimation, has become a central issue on 
the political agenda. Since then, when judges and politicians started to 
compete in the public sphere, the first aiming at a general recognition and 
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legitimization of their role as guarantor of the “control of public virtue”, the 
latter worried for the risks of judicial prosecution due to the systemic nature 
of illegal activities in the political system, a cleavage emerged between political 
and judicial institutions that could not be easily mended (PIZZORNO, 1998). 
 
3. Thanks to the evidence generated by judicial inquiries Italy can be 
taken as a paradigmatic case of the failure of institutional mechanisms, policies 
and countermeasures to limit the diffusion of systemic corruption in an 
advanced democracy. Political competition has proved to be largely 
ineffective. On the contrary, corruption has been often justified in the public 
debate as necessary means for parties and political actors to satisfy their need 
for financial resources (the alleged “cost of democracy”). Moreover, apart 
from the most acute phase of the scandal, effects of corruption revelations on 
electoral choices has been quite limited, in certain cases (Berlusconi, for 
instance) almost nil: in fact, bribe money is normally re-invested into political 
competition and in the operation of clientelistic machines, therefore 
neutralizing the potential loss of consent for politicians involved in judicial 
inquiries (SBERNA, VANNUCCI, 2013). Finally, in Italy corruption – as 
shown by mani pulite and confirmed in subsequent investigations – generally 
involves together a plurality of political actors belonging to both ruling and 
opposition parties, at both central and local levels, extending into this hidden 
arena consociational practices which cancelled the potential denounce of 
political opponents (PIZZORNO, 1993). 
The rule of law and its framework of legal counterweights, 
administrative and judicial controls, has also proved to be ineffective – with 
the partial and momentary exception of the mani pulite inquiries themselves. 
Severe obstructions to judges’ activity were introduced in several “ad 
personam” laws, aimed at shielding Berlusconi from certain charges, but 
ultimately generating an increase of the potential impunity for all white-collar 
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criminals. Moreover, the over-regulated Italian administrative system has 
produced a parallel multiplication and overlap of formal monitoring 
mechanisms, which sometimes has merely increased the number and the size 
of bribes that have had to be paid in order to avoid controls. 
Civil society did not act as an effective check on the spread of political 
and administrative illegality, as soon as the widespread popular support given 
to the judges’ actions in the early years after 1992 vanished (DAVIGO, 1998). 
Nor did market competition offer a significant resilience against the practice 
of corruption: no denounce came from entrepreneurs and their associations, 
which on the contrary often exploited their political connections and 
protections to obtain contracts, concessions, privileges.  
4. To conclude, the “mani pulite” inquiries can be considered as an 
extraordinary success in the short term, but a failure in the longer time 
horizon.  Judicial inquiries - even when they are successful in the prosecution 
of crimes - can in fact expose and sanction illegal activities and white-collars 
crimes, but they cannot remove the deep-rooted causes of corruption. Lack of 
transparency and accountability in politics and bureaucracy,  weak social and 
political control over the exercise of power, wrong and immoral mechanisms 
of selection of the political elite; a legacy of systemic corruption with its 
enduring, non-written rules: these and other well-established factors of 
corruption cannot be eradicated by judges. Judicial inquiries can only scratch 
the surface of illegality, they can hardly modify the invisible structure of non-
written norms, expectations and values which rules in the realm of systemic 
corruption. When a significant quote of the members of the elite have 
developed a long-lasting belief that corruption is the “normal way things have 
to be done”, corrupt activities – in spite of their dramatic collective 
consequences – acquire a strong resilience to investigations and scandals. 
Paradoxically, they can even find some sort of “cultural” justification, since 
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bribes can be useful to one’s political party, enterprise, family or clan, and this 
becomes the ultimate self-excuse for the participation to illegal practices. 
Even worse, in Italy corrupt politicians, public servants and 
entrepreneurs have learnt the lesson of mani pulite, developing more 
sophisticated skills and technics to practice corruption with higher probability 
of impunity, for instance dissimulating bribe payment, or multiplying conflicts 
of interests, i.e. a dangerous overlapping between public decision-makers and 
their private entrepreneurial interests (DELLA PORTA, VANNUCCI, 2012; 
VANNUCCI, 2012).  The overemphasis on the role of magistrates, to whom 
civil society after 1992 delegated the task of renewing and “purifying” the 
political class, turned out to be a boomerang, generating an escalation of 
institutional tensions been political powers – especially the coalition headed by 
Silvio Berlusconi – and the judiciary (PIZZORNO, 1998). Its social legacy has 
been the delegitimization of public institutions and authorities and a deep-
rooted pessimism concerning the integrity of political and economic elites; as 
well as a strengthening of the widespread public and political tolerance of 
illegal practices. Another drawback of mani pulite is the stronger “sense of 
impunity” among participants to illicit deals, due to the long-term 
ineffectiveness of prosecution when the change of political climate and 
specific measures – letting hundreds of defendants to get away thanks to a 
more favourable statute of limitations regime.  The capability to assure 
convictions of those – especially the most powerful – whose involvement in 
corruption has been demonstrated is essential for at least a couple of reasons. 
Because it rises the perception of a penal risk in the practice of corruption 
among those involved, reducing the incentives to participate in it. And 
because it has a very strong symbolic effect, showing that “the law is equal for 
anyone”, therefore increasing a popular confidence towards public institutions 
otherwise hindered by corruption itself. In Italy such conditions were not met. 
The economic heritage has been a blurring of the boundaries between the 
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market and state activities: as an alleged (and ineffective) remedy against 
corruption in Italy the public sphere weakened by privatization, the 
emergence of mixed public/private arrangements in the delivery of public 
services, especially at local level; the intensive delegation to private actors of 
public functions: a multiplication of conflicts of interest due to the political 
careers of entrepreneurs, and the entrepreneurial vocations of politicians – 
factors which have made corruption more difficult to prevent, detect and 
punish. 
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